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Olivia Neistat
The American legislative system is characterized by checks and balances, but also by 
individual interests that make preservation of that balance essential. In this paper, I will 
discuss the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, or CAATSA, 
the Trump administration’s reaction to it, and why the resulting actions by the 
governmental agencies charged with implementation constitutes bureaucratic drift. 
to represent the situation, I will examine implications of the theory and its political 
desirability.
News, Conor Finnegan details the history of CAATSA, meant to punish Russian 
intelligence and defense sectors for meddling in the 2016 American presidential 
election.55 After U.S. intelligence discovered Russian interference, the Obama 
administration imposed new sanctions on Russian individuals and entities at fault, 
freezing their assets in the United States (or denominated in dollars) and preventing 
them from entering the country. But in light of new information concerning the depth 
and breadth of the intrusion, Congress wanted to go further. In June of 2017, the Senate 
passed a bipartisan bill targeting Iran and Russia with new sanctions that expanded the 
opposition, claiming that the pieces targeting Russia were too harsh and would limit 
diplomatic possibilities. However, that opposition was ignored with the passage of the 
sanctions on North Korea as well. Both chambers then collaborated on North Korea 
the Senate 98-2 on July 27.
Following the legislation’s passage by Congress, Trump had one week to veto the bill, 
sign it into law, or take no action and allow it to become law automatically. On August 
2, Trump grudgingly signed CAATSA into law, but released blistering statements 
56 
Despite the administration’s view of the law as unconstitutional, it also pledged it 
55 ABC News, Accessed 
December 13, 2017, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/timeline-trumps-delays-russia-sanctions/
56
trump-signing-countering-americas.
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would implement the law: on August 3, State Department spokesperson Heather 
the Congressional mandate.57 
Russia portion on October 1. The White House was scheduled to have authorized 
governmental agencies to identify Russian entities subject to sanctions, but the 
deadline came and went without much progress. Shortly before October 1 the Trump 
administration gave the authorization, but the requested list of Russians remained 
missing for weeks. The State Department claimed progress was slow because it was 
working with the Treasury to develop guidance for allies and private companies to help 
58 However, apparently 
this bottleneck only slowed down the Russia portion, as the requirements for the Iran 
piece of the same bill were completed on time.
The list of Russians and accompanying guidance was eventually sent to Congress on 
October 26, but not without prodding and foot dragging. The original intent of the bill 
was to enact swift and decisive action against hostile foreign powers, but our response 
has been anything but swift or decisive. In fact, there has not been any action on Russia 
sanctions since the list was sent to Congress at the end of October, and this paper will 
explain how bureaucratic drift could be to blame.59 
Bureaucratic drift is a theory proposed by Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and 
Barry Weingast, collectively known as McNollgast.60 Contrasting other theorists on 
bureaucratic behavior, they take the principal-agent perspective, which suggests that 
any imbalance in the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians favors the 
politicians rather than the bureaucrats. Within this framework, the politicians act as 
the principals, picking the agents they want in bureaucratic positions at governmental 
agencies and sustaining them with power and resources in order to get the job they want 
done according to their agendas. Policies are created by politicians, but implemented 
by bureaucrats, who enjoy a certain amount of freedom to pursue their own interests 
through that power of implementation. Bureaucratic agents can further their own 
policy priorities by changing from the politicians’ ideal implementation of a law, and 
57
Accessed December 13, 2017, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2017/08/273018.htm.
58
2017, Accessed December 13, 2017, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2017/10/275068.htm.
59 KJZZ, November 17, 2017, Accessed
December 13, 2017, https://kjzz.org/content/568155/why-havent-russian-sanctions-been-
implemented.
60
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avoid punishment by deviating just shy of far enough that no alternative is preferred 
and President. In his book Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions, 
Kenneth Shepsle compares divergent governmental agencies to a dog on a leash that 
61 This is essentially what a rogue 
agency can do; after a policy is decided on politically and delegated for bureaucratic 
implementation, they are free to tilt the scale a bit more in their preferred direction as 
away from the letter of the law once carried out.
62 The points labelled 
H, S, and P represent the legislative interests of the House, Senate, and President, 
respectively. Each has their own priorities and ideal versions of any given bill depending 
on those priorities (the House and Senate points are realistically 435 and 100 dots 
clustered around each, but represented as one average for each), and x represents the 
compromise made to meet somewhere within those three points in order to pass the bill 
into law. McNollgast’s visual model of bureaucratic drift:
61 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions
W.W. Norton, 2010).
62
Virginia Law Review (1989).
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B represents the interests of the bureaucratic agency responsible for implementing 
the legislation agreed on at x, and y represents that agency’s ideal version of the bill 
according to those interests. In theory, anywhere within this triangle would still be 
x agreed upon has to be somewhere around the center of the triangle to be signed into 
law, but can shift once out of the legislators’ hands. Point x’ represents where the policy 
could end up once passed to a bureaucratic agency for implementation. Once in their 
if it attempted to get to it’s true preference, y, which lies outside the triangle, it risks 
being overruled by new legislation or losing their position as a bureaucrat, as there 
are policies that original acting coalition unanimously prefers to it. In addition, while 
pulling legislation in one way or another but still remaining inside the triangle, the 
bureaucrat is always acting in the interest of at least one of the members of the enacting 
coalition, and thus gains an ally that will protect the agency’s pull in the event that the 
others protest.
The State Department and Treasury’s treatment of the Countering America’s 
Adversaries Through Sanctions Act illustrates an example of bureaucratic drift. In the 
diagram below representing the situation, the House, Senate, and President are again 
labelled as H, S, and P. The H and S points are relatively close to each other because 
their policy priorities were very similar (as were 435 and 100 individual dots clustered 
Trump was vehemently opposed to the bill throughout the whole legislative process, 
and argued against sanctions altogether. The bill passed the House and Senate with 
such an overwhelming (and veto-proof) majority that they essentially forced Trump’s 
hand, ensuring that a version close to their own interests, and very far from his, became 
law.
bureaucratic drift to represent the positions of the House, Senate, President, and 
relevant bureaucratic agencies as they pertain ot passage and implementation of the 
CAATSA:
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Based on the State Department and Treasury’s treatment the matter, it is clear that since 
the bill has passed, they adopted Trump’s opposition and have been pulling the policy 
in the president’s preferred direction. After missing implementation deadlines, both 
that it was complicated and would take some time.63 However, they had no problem 
getting the Iran portion done on time, which points to the possibility that they are 
in October came and went, Senators McCain and Cardin penned a letter to the White 
House criticizing the administration’s failure to enforce the sanctions.64 In a joint 
statement released on October 11, McCain and Cardin expressed concern about the 
question the Trump administration’s commitment to the sanctions bill which was 
signed into law more than two months ago, following months of public debate and 
65 
63 ABC News, Accessed 
December 13, 2017, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/timeline-trumps-delays-russia-sanctions/
64
Business Insider, October 12, 2017, Accessed 
December 13, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-russia-sanctions-mccain-cardin-
letter-2017-10.
65
IMPLEMENTATION - Press Releases - United States Senator John McCain, Accessed 
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The White House declined to respond to the criticism directly, but had already made 
clear their opposition to the bill and reluctance to cooperate. In response to Trump’s 
continued resistance, the bureaucratic agencies authorized to implement the law are 
doing everything in their power keep the president happy while remaining within the 
bounds of the triangle. It is obvious why the State Department and Treasury would 
not meeting his expectations (FBI Director James Comey, numerous U.S. Attorneys 
66). Trump has 
made known that he has no problem getting rid of bureaucrats who displease him, 
thus, when given the opportunity to maintain good favor, the State Department and 
Treasury do so. Steve Mnuchin, currently serving as Treasury Secretary, has a history 
of falling in line behind Trump during his tenure so far.67 In contrast, Secretary of 
State Rex Tillerson has publicly feuded with Trump before, once calling the President 
68
States in retaliation.69 For either secretary, whether they have had issue with Trump so 
far or not, it is evident why they would want to do everything in their power to keep 
the president happy: if they decline to do so, they take the chance that could result in 
sabotage of their working relationship with him, stunting of their ability to get anything 
done, losing their jobs, or seeing their reputation destroyed in a public quarrel.
When considering the positions of actors and their interests in this particular case, 
than what is normal for bill passage, but they formed a triangle nonetheless, and should 
generate accurate predictions. This means that the actors in this scenario will abide 
by the same rules as those in the original, meaning that no matter how forcefully the 
president pressures the State Department and Treasury, they still can only pull the bill 
as far as the edge of the triangle in implementation.
December 13, 2017, https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/10/senators-
mccain-cardin-question-administration-delay-in-russia-sanctions-implementation.
66 The 
Washington Post, July 25, 2017, Accessed December 13, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.
67
The New York Times, September 15, 2017, Accessed December 13, 2017, https://www.nytimes.
68 CNN, 
October 05, 2017, Accessed December 13, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/10/04/politics/
tillerson-trump-moron/index.html.
69
ABC News, , accessed December 13, 2017, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-
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The predicted outcome that the State Department and Treasury will only drift the 
CAATSA so far as the boundaries allowed by the legislative triangle is, for the most 
part, socially desirable. Some would argue that in this outcome is not socially desirable 
because in this case, the drift is the result of extreme pressure from the executive 
what, if anything, Trump’s former national security advisor Michael Flynn’s Russia 
communications70 or Rex Tillerson’s ties to Russian oil projects through Exxon Mobil71 
have to do with this. However, I would argue against that perspective. Even though one 
instance of bureaucratic drift results in something other than our preferred outcome, 
the system as a whole is stable and keeps legislation within acceptable bounds, even in 
the face of antagonists attempting to pull implementation far outside the bounds of 
original intent and quite possibly away from America’s best interests.
Bureaucrats retain the power to skew policy in the direction of their interests (or, the 
interests of those who wield power over them) which can fall anywhere on a scale from 
intriguing to alarming depending on your stake in the legislation at hand. However, 
more than anything else, bureaucratic drift speaks to the strength of the Madisonian 
branches of government, no matter the pressure or incentive.
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